di Marie Kortam [*]
From the beginning of the war on October 7th, 2023, the main focus of European countries seems to be the welfare and the rescue of the hostages. This concern has evolved into a geopolitical one, as the hostage situation has escalated tensions and complicated diplomatic efforts. The lack of a solution to the hostage crisis has raised Europe’s alarm while causing European countries to pressure Israel to focus on the hostage crisis.
The shift in world perception towards a greater understanding of the Palestinian struggle and the perception of Israel’s military actions as disproportionate led to first a decrease then an increase in aid sent to Gaza by European countries and the EU. This aid has been contested throughout the Gaza war, but this evolution is the fruit of a long process.
Since 7 October, the EU countries and the UK have concentrated their diplomatic efforts on joining the US in expressing their solidarity with the Palestinians. The US and Europe are too preoccupied with the short-term management of the situation, hoping to strike a difficult balance between standing with Israel and containing the humanitarian tragedy in Gaza. U countries are firmly in support of Israel, swiftly condemning Hamas’ October 7 attack and labelling them as “terrorists”. They have described the assault as “heinous,” “horrific”, and a “tragedy for Israel, the Jewish people, and also for Europe”. Leaders like Ursula Von Der Leyen have emphasized Israel’s right to self-defense “against such heinous attacks”, which allows Israel to respond assertively in Gaza without international condemnation.
Several major EU cities have displayed solidarity with Israel by projecting the Israeli flag alongside the EU flag. Simultaneously, pro-Palestinian protests face repression in some countries such as France and Germany, where pro-Palestinian groups are being banned. EU leaders have transitioned to more nuanced messages. In a joint statement on October 10th, they condemned Hamas “terrorist actions” while recognizing the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people and advocating for justice and freedom for both Israelis and Palestinians. French President Emmanuel Macron, on national television, asserted Israel’s right to self-defense, including eliminating terrorist groups like Hamas, while protecting civilian populations.
This chapter examines the political positioning of the European countries during the first three months of the war, from October to December 2023. More specifically, it tackles, three main countries: France, Germany and the United Kingdom, in addition to the EU. This work offers a country-based analysis to develop the position of each country of Gaza war and ends by a thematic analysis on the protests supporting Palestinians in Europe. The research focuses on how historical, political, and sociocultural factors influence diplomatic stances and international responses. The choice to analyze the first three months of the Gaza conflict is methodologically grounded in the need for clarity, precision, and relevance. This time frame allows the study to provide foundational insights into the conflict’s origins, immediate impacts, and early narratives, setting the stage for deeper, longitudinal analyses in the future. It employs a qualitative approach, emphasizing interpretative and critical analysis to investigate the motivations, actions, and implications of European diplomacy during the Gaza war. This approach is well-suited for exploring the nuanced and multifaceted nature of political strategies, as it allows for in-depth examination of primary sources, secondary literature, and theoretical interpretations. Desk reviews of media articles, governmental publications, official press releases, and NGO reports provide primary data sources. The selected media aligns with the overarching goal of the research: to critically analyze the intersection of European diplomacy and humanitarian implications in the Gaza conflict.
Scholarly articles and reports from international organizations offer secondary sources to corroborate findings. Country case studies are used to explore specific instances of European engagement in the Gaza conflict.
Aims and questions
The aims of this chapter are to provide a comprehensive understanding of European diplomacy in the Gaza war, in the one hand; in the second hand, to operationalize the concept of “European neutrality” versus “strategic alignment” within the framework of international relations. And finally, to assess the gaps between diplomatic rhetoric and on-ground humanitarian realities. The Gaza conflict and European diplomatic responses have been the subject of substantial academic and policy-oriented discourse. While existing literature offers critical insights, notable gaps remain, particularly concerning the intersection of geopolitics, human rights, and the long-term implications of European policies in the region.
Much of the literature focuses on the historical and geopolitical roots of the Gaza conflict. Khalidi (2010) explores the colonial and postcolonial dimensions of the conflict, while Shlaim (2001) highlights the role of European powers in the broader Arab Israeli dynamics. Scholars have examined the role of European powers, particularly the United States and the European Union, in shaping the Israeli Palestinian conflict. These studies often emphasize strategic alliances, such as U.S. support for Israel and its implications for regional stability. Academic discourse frequently critiques the inconsistency between European rhetoric on human rights and their actions. Farsakh (2005) and Pappé (2006) argue that European policies often prioritize strategic alliances over genuine humanitarian interventions. While these works provide valuable historical context, they often lack an in-depth analysis of the humanitarian impact of European diplomatic strategies on Gaza’s civilian population during the ongoing conflict. The interaction between geopolitical interests and human security remains underexplored.
Conceptual and analytical framework
This research uses a multi-dimensional lens, combining political science theories and international relations frameworks. Constructivism theory (Wendt, 1999; Barnett, 1999) is used to understand how historical narratives, societal values and identity politics (e.g., Germany’s Holocaust legacy) shape national policies toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Neorealism helps to explore strategic and security concerns and focuses on how states prioritize security and strategic alliances in the face of conflicts (Mearsheimer, 2001), analyzing the Europe’s diplomatic balance between supporting Israel and addressing humanitarian concerns in Gaza. Humanitarianism and international law analyzes the application (or lack thereof) of international humanitarian principles in European responses, especially regarding civilian protection and humanitarian aid delivery (Finnemore, 2003; Akram and al. 2011).
Three levels of analysis are taking into consideration: the macro, meso and micro. The macro level examines the collective EU statements and divergence among member states. The meso level specifies policy actions and stances of key countries: France, Germany, and the UK. The micro level covers the grassroots protests and public opinion within European nations and the impact of political decisions on individuals, including diaspora communities and affected populations in Gaza.
The analytical tools used are discourse, comparative and policy impact analysis. Those tools are used to evaluate how media and political leaders frame the conflict, to contrast the policies of different European nations and regional blocs and to assess the humanitarian and political consequences of European actions.
European Union position
The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner and a major donor to the Palestinian Authority, yet it has failed to use this leverage effectively. While calling for peace, its economic and diplomatic ties with Israel often remain unaffected by Israeli military operations in Gaza, which leads to criticism that the EU is not doing enough to pressure Israel to adhere to international norms regarding occupation and human rights.
On 22 October 2023, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, France, Germany and Italy issued a joint statement (UK Government, 2023a) expressing their support for Israel and its right to defend itself against terrorism, calling for adherence to international humanitarian law, including the protection of civilians, and the release of all hostages. There were significant internal divisions within the EU about the war and a spectrum of views regarding calling for a ceasefire (Brzozowski, 2023). Ireland (Biser, 2023), Spain (La Moncloa, 2023), Luxembourg (RTL infos, 2023) clearly expressed support for a ceasefire. European countries that were still reluctant to call for any halt to the fighting have gradually done that during the third week, following the pace of US positions on the matter.
After lengthy negotiations, in a joint declaration on October 26, the 27 EU leaders expressed their “gravest concern for the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza” (Mared, Shona, TIdey, 2023) and called “for continued, rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and aid to reach those in need through all necessary measures including humanitarian corridors and pauses for humanitarian needs” (ibid.).
The EU’s position presents itself with diverse stances that are influenced by different member states’ historical and political backgrounds. The main examples being Germany and Ireland. Germany’s history of antisemitism has led to a strong pro-Israeli stance and a support of human rights violations by Israel, while Ireland’s history of occupation and colonization has led to expressing solidarity with the Palestinian cause, in addition to Spain, Norway and Belgium. This has led to a lack of strong concrete position by the EU. For now, the European model is a pro-Israeli stance and concrete humanitarian aid to Gaza, to appease both the domestic situation in Europe (with calls for a ceasefire and pro-Palestinian demonstrations) and Israel.
European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen has faced significant backlash for her overt show of solidarity with Israel, particularly in the aftermath of the 7th of October “terrorist” attack. Critics argue that her “unreserved solidarity” and “unconditional support” for Israel deviated from the nuanced and balanced approach typically expected of the European Union in international conflicts. Over 800 commission officials expressed concern highlighting internal discord over her positioning and claiming she did not confer with the rest of the EU members. The essence of the criticism is that while expressing support for an ally after a terrorist attack is understandable, offering unequivocal backing without considering the complexities or consulting member states compromises the collective representation the European Commission is supposed to uphold.
After five weeks, the world perception shifted towards a greater understanding for the Palestinian struggle and the perception of Israel’s military actions as disproportionate resulting in increased aid being sent to Gaza. In fact, the EU is increasing the amount of humanitarian aid it is sending to Gaza by 25 million euros, Von Der Leyen has said that “two weeks ago we had already tripled aid to Gaza” (European Commission, 2023a) bringing the EU’s spending on humanitarian assistance for Gaza to over €100 million this year. This appears to be the response of government bodies to the reaction of their public which has seen a rise in support for Palestinians in the form of protests and boycotts all around Europe. This position of Von Der Lyn can be criticized for using humanitarian aid to cover for war crimes.
The position of EU countries has generally stressed hostages release and humanitarian access. Leaders of all 27 countries in the EU have called for the “immediate and unconditional” release of all the hostages. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell has expressed his full support for UN Secretary-General António Guterres and called for hostages to be released immediately without conditions. Moreover, the EU is to open a humanitarian airlift to the Gaza Strip, and announced a tripling of humanitarian aid to Gaza from 25 to 75 million euros.
There have been divisions among the EU on positioning (Staunton, 2023). On 10 October, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell notably said some of Israel’s actions in Gaza are “against international law”; and Charles Michel, the president of the EU Council, on 14 October issued a statement (Reuters, 2023a) and letter to the EU’s 27 member states calling for restraint and respect for international humanitarian law. In parallel, what was described to Crisis Group as an “internal war” within the EU over the invocation of international law burst into the open (Staunton, 2023).
Top European officials who over recent months had agonized over why non-European capitals regard with “scepticism Europe’s calls for action in Ukraine appear tone-deaf to the double standard their silence on Israel’s Gaza campaign signals around the world” (International Crisis Group, 2023). Furthermore, there has been a subtle rise of “refugee resettlement” as a prominent topic of debate within Europe. There were attempts to further involve Europe and the EU by highlighting that the conflict is likely to result in a large refugee migration towards Europe. Two Israeli lawmakers, one of them from Netanyahu’s Likud party, have called upon European countries to take in Gazan refugees (MEM, 2023). However, this call was met with criticism amid repeated that Israel is ultimately trying to expel Palestinians from the land in order to occupy it. The response within the EU is not clear yet, with the British government refusing to comment on the call, and the only positive reception coming from Humza Yousaf, Scotland’s first minister, who has discussed the possibility of granting safe passage into Scotland for Gazan citizens who voluntarily want to relocate.
The current conflict has also shown cracks in the leadership of the EU, with Ursula Von Der Leyen being subject to criticism, amid allegations of a discrepancy in the way that the EU has been dealing with the Israeli-Hamas conflict and Ukraine-Russia conflict. In fact, the Ukraine war had made Von Der Leyen a symbol of a unified Europe. On the other hand, it is Josep Borrell that has been the EU’s face with regard to the conflict, with his latest statement stressing that Israel should not have control of Gaza after the war and that “a Palestinian authority must return to Gaza” (Barigazzi, Moens, 2023) he was clear to specify that he did not mean the Palestinian Authority but rather one Palestinian authority. A division can be seen, because with regard to the post-war debate, von Der Leyen has echoed the German idea of “an international peace force under a UN mandate” (ibid.). Furthermore, Borrell rectified the issue when a European commissioner from Hungary announced the immediate suspension of EU aid to Palestine in the wake of October 7. Borrell appears as the proactive approach by the EU to the Hamas-Israeli conflict.
The division within the EU makes it hard to agree or influence the ongoing conflict. In fact, despite the EU’s limited influence on the conflict there has been an increased awareness of the possible backlash faced by the EU due to the war. The backlashes that have been brought to the forefront of the debate (by both European and Israeli authorities) have been a) the rise of community tensions within Europe with a specific focus on the rise of antisemitism, b) the potential increase in acts of terrorism and attacks by extremist Islamist militants, and c) the flow of refugees as a byproduct of the conflict. These concerns have become a prominent topic of debate and have led to increased calls for the unification of an EU position.
In response to the four-day truce agreed upon by Israel and Hamas, the EU has called for a “humanitarian surge” in Gaza. The humanitarian aid chief of the bloc has brought emphasis on the need for a substantial delivery of humanitarian aid, and the opening of additional land crossings and maritime humanitarian corridors to ensure the delivery of aid to Gazans. With this in mind, it seems that while there is no large shift in the EU’s stance, there are nuanced aspects that lead to the bloc adopting less of a pro-Israel stance with more focus on the humanitarian needs of the civilians suffering from the war.
Following the US visa ban on violent Israeli settlers, it is expected that the EU will adopt a similar policy after 13 out of 27 EU foreign ministers spoke out in support of such action (Tidey, Mared, 2023). Two days after Josep Borrell said he would put forward a proposal to sanction the West Bank settlers, Ursula Von Der Leyen backed such proposal stating that “this violence has nothing to do with the fight against Hamas and must stop” (ibid.). However, there have been no known cessations of arms exports to Israel, especially from Germany which supplies 15% of Israeli arms and Italy which supplies just under 3% (Gritten, 2024).
Overall, EU support of Israel has eroded over the past two months as shown by the United Nations General Assembly vote where a majority of 17 out of 27 EU countries voted in favor of a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire (UNRIC, 2023). The Prime Ministers of Belgium, Ireland, and Spain (who have consolidated their allied stance on the issue) along with Malta, pushed an EU leaders’ summit that would press for a ceasefire in Gaza. They wrote a letter to the European Council President Charles Michel that the European Union needs to act not only because of the brutalities but also because the EU “credibility is at stake” (Jacqué, Ricard, 2024). It is clear that the division within the EU and its inability to take a stance on the conflict are revealing its lack of influence in the Middle East.
At week 10 of the war, the European Commission began an assistance package to the Palestinian Authority (PA) of €118 million (European Commission, n.d.). This financial assistance aims to be used to pay for the salaries and pensions of civil servants in the West Bank, social allowances of vulnerable families, payments for medical referrals and to support the administrative and technical capacity of the Palestinian Authority institutions. This package has been referred to as the short-term package to complement the mid-term package that is foreseen in the next year with the aim of contributing to laying the groundwork for economic and political stability of Gaza.
A joint statement by Josep Borrell and Janez Lenarčič, Commissioner for Crisis Management, have highlighted the risk of famine in the Gaza Strip, detailing the shock experiences when learning about the data regarding food insecurity. The statement also revealed that the EU has set aside €125 million in humanitarian support for the coming year (European Commission, 2023b). Additionally, the EU has condemned the demolition of a Palestinian School in the West Bank that had been funded by the European bloc. Within the European bloc, we can see some of Israel’s closest European allies pressing for a ceasefire with Hamas, primarily the UK and Germany.
France
France suffers from the incoherent application of principles in the war A Gaza. While France emphasizes human rights and humanitarian law, criticism argues that it has not been inconsistent to apply pressure on Israel for its military actions in Gaza. France has condemned the expansion of Israeli regulations and criticized the blockade of Gaza, but it did not support these criticisms with significant diplomatic or economic measures, such as sanctions or arms embargoes.
While France’s official stance has not shifted, French President Emmanuel Macron’s proposition for a “Maritime humanitarian coalition” (Jacqué, 2023) concerning Gaza, in collaboration with several European countries, signals France’s intent to actively engage in and potentially lead a diplomatic solution. The emphasis on a “Maritime humanitarian coalition” can be seen as a careful diplomatic maneuver. While it underscores the urgency of addressing the human toll of the conflict, it also avoids directly confronting or assigning blame to the warring parties. This could be a calculated move by Macron to ensure France remains a neutral arbiter, capable of dialoguing with all involved entities.
At the commencement of the conflict, it appeared that the Macron administration undoubtedly placed their support with Israel; however, it appears that the administration is taking steps towards a more balanced position. This places the country closer to Spain and Ireland while still aligning with some of the views of the UK. This shift has come following the strike on the Agence France Presse quarters as well as the Institut Français (France Diplomatie, 2023a) in Gaza, without causing any casualties. While Macron remains firm on his support of Israel in the public sphere, MFA communiqués have condemned the settler violence in the West Bank (France Diplomatie, 2023b) and expressed very strong concern over the number of civilian victims in Gaza (France Diplomatie, 2023c), condemned attacks against UN sites and personnel and against media quarters, called for a humanitarian truce, and stated the civilian population in Gaza does not have to pay for Hamas’ crime.
On November 9, French President Emmanuel Macron hosted an international humanitarian conference for Gaza’s civilian population. The conference brought together more than 80 entities in the Palais de l’Elysée, including officials from over 50 countries, the United Nations and humanitarian organizations. Few Arab national delegations were present, including the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. European Council President Charles Michel and European Commission President Ursula Von Der Leyen also attended the conference. Israeli authorities were not invited but have been informed of the talks, Macron’s office said. The US sent a team at a lower level of representation.
Macron opened the conference with an appeal for Israel to protect civilians, saying that “all lives have equal worth” (Le Monde, 2023). He said that to do that, “we need a humanitarian pause very quickly and we must work towards a cease-fire” (ibid.). The President announced that France will allocate an additional 80 million euros to humanitarian aid for the Palestinian population this year, reaching a total of 100 million euros. The gathering ended a few hours before the White House said Israel had agreed to put in place four-hour daily humanitarian pauses in Gaza, starting on Thursday. The French presidency said the participants’ overall pledges topped 1 billion euros in funding, including some funds already announced earlier, and stressed that the global amount still remains to be finalized.
However, publicly Israel’s President, has backed Macron’s plan for the international coalition against ISIS to fight Hamas. This portrays France’s stance as a carefully balanced act attempting to keep both the domestic and international sphere’s interests satisfied. During the weeks, the French official position has been shifting towards a more “pro-humanitarian” stance, and the latest development was Macron calling for a ceasefire on Sunday, November 10. His comments about the lack of legitimacy for the civilian deaths in Gaza sparked a retaliation from the Israeli government: Netanyahu told reporters that the Macron had “made a serious mistake factually and morally” (Caulcutt, Kayali, 2023). Even Israeli President Herzog commented that Macron “caused much pain and upset in Israel” (ibid.) clearly indicating a strain between the two countries. Reports of phone calls between Macron and Netanyahu suggested that Macron had been attempting to smooth tensions with Israel and in fact, the French state has restated Israel’s right to defend itself and recalled the need for Hamas to recognise the State of Israel and past agreements. Macron’s approach is to attempt a balancing act (De Weck, 2023).
The Minister of the Armed Forces, Lecornu, stated that the President’s stance is in line with the historical position France has taken on the conflict. Paris has continuously voiced its support for a two-state solution following the tradition dating back to Charles de Gaulle, and its latest remarks on the conflict can be better understood in this context. However, Paris refused to join Spain, Norway, Ireland, and Slovenia in recognizing Palestine. The domestic sphere can also explain the context from which Macron’s statement rose, as the increase in pro-Palestinian protests a reason as to why the official stance has shifted towards a focus on the humanitarian issues within Gaza. Regardless of Macron’s calls for a ceasefire, the official position is still being contested in the domestic arena.
A dozen French ambassadors with missions in the Middle East and Maghreb signed a letter expressing regret due to the French position. An anonymous signatory specified that the letter is addressed to the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the regret is regarding the pro-Israeli turn adopted by President Macron. The Foreign Affairs Ministry downplayed the letter stating that regardless it is the citizen-elected political authorities that decide French foreign policy. These reactions point to a perceived pro-Israeli stance by domestic actors, which Macron seems to be trying to shift with his statements and personal diplomacy that included a visit to Israel, the West Bank, Egypt, Jordan and engagements with Palestinian Authority representatives. French official position suggested an attempt to portray a concern for both humanitarian issues and the pursuit of a peaceful, long-term solution. France also has “strongly condemned the attacks by groups of settlers in the West Bank on Palestinians” according to the French Foreign Ministry. This statement focused on the attack in Qarawat Bani Hassan where a Palestinian was killed in the presence of Israeli soldiers.
French policy on the Gaza war continues to be criticized for being vague and “erratic”. The president of the EU Institute for Prospective Security has accused Macron of “regatta diplomacy” which has led him to “steer to port one day and starboard the next”. Minister of Foreign Affairs Catherine Colonna and Minister of Armed Forces Sébastian Lecornu wrote a joint text attempting to map out French policy. The French objectives were stated as such “a lasting truce that allows for the release of hostages, increased humanitarian access [and] opens the possibility of a ceasefire and restores a political horizon” (Wintour, 2023a).
France voted in favor of the United Nations General Assembly resolution that called for an immediate ceasefire and urged the United Nations Security Council to do more in order to address the ongoing conflict. However, France has also taken actions that suggest a more pro-Israeli leaning. French President Emanuel Macron, disregarding France’s principle of secularism, celebrated the Jewish holiday of Hannukah at the Élysée. Furthermore, a conference was held in Paris with more than 20 countries but no Arab states on the criminalization of Hamas. At the conference presentations were made only by Israel, the United States, and France. Along with Germany and Italy, France has been pushing the EU to create specific sanctions against Hamas.
After three months of war, Macron has stated that Israel’s response is not proportionate and that fighting terrorism does not mean “flattening Gaza”. The President also called for the protection of “all lives” because they are worth the same. Furthermore, France continues to advocate for a prevention of escalation in the Gaza conflict, the latest effort through a phone call with President El-Sisi of Egypt where they agreed to intensify efforts to prevent a regional escalation.
Furthermore, more than 4000 French or French-Israeli individuals are fighting in the Israeli army in Gaza. This has raised questions about whether French nationals should be tried for war crimes upon their return (Tașkin, 2023). Furthermore, France Palestinian Solidarity Association has also questioned the responsibility of French settlers in war crimes in the occupied West Bank, adding that these individuals should be held accountable.
Germany
Germany’s official stance on the Israel-Hamas conflict is deeply intertwined with its historical context and responsibility toward Israel due to the Holocaust. Germany has expressed a strong Support for Israel and a limited Criticism of Israel. Kertin Muller’s reference to Germany’s “Staatsraison” or “reason of state” which encompasses a commitment to Israel’s security, underscores a nuanced obligation that Germany feels due to the Holocaust. The mention of Germany’s “crisis diplomacy tour” involving talks with regional power brokers like Egypt’s El-Sisi, Turkey’s Erdogan, and Qatar signifies Germany’s proactive approach to potentially mediate or influence a resolution. Cooperation with the US emphasizes Germany’s reliance on transatlantic alliances, hinting at the Western alignment of its foreign policy.
Germany’s main focus is tackling internal “antisemitism” as it is perceived by the government. Analyses continue to demonstrate that Germany’s stance is based on its antisemitic past and therefore the country attempts to rectify historical mistakes through increased sensitivity for the Jewish community and a proactive approach towards combating antisemitism. Clear legal consequences along with a policy of zero tolerance has led to the German Vice Chancellor’s criticism of Muslim groups. Furthermore, much like the United States, Germany continues to strongly support Israel’s right to defend itself and crackdown on Palestinian protests. The official German position in the Hamas-Israeli conflict continues to back Israel. Furthermore, trends have shown that the country’s internal political dynamics have strongly shaped their stance, and along with Germany’s history this leads the country to a strongly pro-Israeli stance.
Berlin’s dialogue is nuanced in, the latest of which being a clear message stating that while “Israel’s goal is a goal [Berlin] share,” Berlin believes that “it is clear that these goals are hard to achieve with military means only” (Barigazzi, Moens, 2023) suggesting more emphasis be placed on the peace process as opposed to the military operations. This nuanced shift can also be perceived in the words of the German Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock, who stated that she totally understood the impulse to call for a ceasefire “in this terrible situation where innocent children, people, women, mothers, families are not only suffering so terribly but are dying” (National Herald, 2023). However, this statement was followed by the Foreign Minister questioning how can “Israel’s security (be) guaranteed” if a ceasefire was bargained.
However, a notable development, was Germany’s contribution to the post-war debate surrounding Gaza. Politico was shown a document that detailed the idea that the Gaza Strip should be taken under the control of the United Nations (Barigazzi, Moens, 2023). This idea was later echoed by Ursula von Der Leyen in her speech to EU ambassadors, the European Commission President said that various ideas were being discussed, including “an international peace force under the UN mandate” (European Commission, 2023a). However, the idea has also received serious criticism from EU diplomats and even more from Palestinian figures, one of which called the plan “unacceptable” (Hanke Vela, 2023). Furthermore, Berlin has warned that this scenario “would require significant investment of political capital and financing as well as an international coalition to engage on security issues alongside the UN” (Barigazzi, Moens, 2023). Overall, the German suggestion has angered Palestinian officials already unhappy about the lack of mention of a ceasefire and Berlin itself has acknowledged the logistical difficulties of this scenario.
German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has been actively involved in the situation emphasizing Germany’s efforts to ensure places in Gaza that would provide the civilian access to the basic necessities like drinking water and medication, these efforts have been in collaboration with the United States and several Arab countries (Bir, 2023). The Foreign Minister has not pushed for an immediate ceasefire but has highlighted the need for humanitarian pauses as a way of ensuring aid delivery to the enclave.
Germany has also diverted its focus onto Israel’s settlement policy in the West Bank, Baerbock has urged Netanyahu to condemn the attacks of Israeli settlers on the Palestinians in the occupied territories. However, the Foreign Minister continues to highlight Germany’s responsibility to the Jewish people and the state of Israel that stems from the atrocities of World War II, she used the term “reason of state”. In response to the recent truce, Germany has not yet expressed a specific role or concern. The German Foreign Minister has strongly urged Israel to allow necessary humanitarian aid into Gaza. However, the German government continues with its arms sales to Israel which have increased by almost tenfold since 2022 (Reuters, 2023b).
Unsurprisingly, Germany abstained from the United Nations General Assembly vote. While a slight divergence exists between the Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock who said that Germany expects that Israel will adapt its military strategies to minimize civilian deaths (Beaumont, 2023) and the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz who lit the first Hannukah candle in Berlin. However, Scholz also called on Israel to allow more humanitarian aid to flow into Gaza and welcomed the sanctions against extremist Israeli settlers (DW, 2023). In a gradual shift, German foreign affairs minister Annalena Baerbock has called for a “sustainable ceasefire” in a joint article with David Cameron, British Foreign Secretary. Furthermore, two courts in Germany ruled that pro-Palestinian slogans are lawful, and the judge stressed that the slogans be directed against Israel and not the Jewish population (Beaumont, 2023).
The United Kingdom
Post-Brexit, the UK’s influence in the Middle East has diminished, and it has become more aligned with the US and Israel in foreign policy. The UK’s capacity to act as a neutral mediator has therefore decreased, as it is perceived as being more heavily on Israel’s side. This makes it harder for the UK to push for meaningful negotiations or play a more active role in peace processes. British Foreign Minister reiterates Britain’s support for a two-state solution. Cleverly said at the G7 summit “In the short term, it is inevitable that Israel, because they have the troops in Gaza, will need to have a security responsibility” (Wintour, 2023b). He adds, “but our view is as soon as practicable, a move towards a peace-loving Palestinian leadership is the most desired outcome”. At the G7 meeting, top diplomats reinforced their commitment to a two-state solution for the Palestinian question, and called for Iran to stop supporting Hamas, to which Tehran refused, reflecting a weakness of the diplomatic process and the inability to establish goals supported on a global scale by the G7 members (The White House, 2023).
There also seems to be an increased understanding of settler violence as the key to resolving the causes at the root of the conflict. While this is a new trend, it is one that has been gaining more and more traction with Members of Parliament in the UK urging their government to pressure the Israeli government to condemn the extremist actions of settlers, which are deemed illegal worldwide (Wintour, 2023c). This focus also ties into the EU’s support for a two-state solution, as the ongoing settler violence fails to allow for a peaceful and viable Palestinian State.
In the UK, there are growing concerns about the potential suppression of discussions about the war in schools following the government’s call for schools to report students who support Palestinian rights. Education ministers defend this action by citing concerns that “events in the Middle East could be used as an excuse to stir up hatred in communities” (MEE, 2023). Amnesty International has also highlighted linked restrictions and monitoring of Palestinian activism at universities and other public bodies as violations that breach international human rights standards. These developments have led many individuals to change their behavior on contentious issues due to the climate of fear and surveillance. Amnesty International has also highlighted linked restrictions and monitoring of Palestinian activism at universities and other public bodies as violations.
The UK combines a multifaceted commitment to humanitarian aid entering Gaza and a strong stance against terrorism and antisemitism. King Charles gave the first open speech to parliament in 70 years, in which he highlighted the “barbaric acts of terrorism against the people of Israel” (Adam, 2023) which he balanced with a commitment to facilitating humanitarian support to Gaza. Furthermore, the UK has joined the mainstream narrative that is circulating in Europe with regard to the rise of antisemitism, with the King promising the planning of the Holocaust Memorial and Learning Centre. In line with its commitment to Gazan humanitarian aid, Rishi Sunak has spoken to Israeli PM Netanyahu about the “concept of humanitarian pauses” (Snowdon, 2023). However, the PM has also acknowledged the difficulty of arranging pauses in the fighting, reflecting a pragmatic approach.
David Cameron’s tenure as Prime Minister witnessed a dual approach: advocating for a two-state solution in the Israel-Palestine conflict, while also supporting Israel, notably during heightened tensions in Gaza. Cameron’s historical stance on the region, characterized by criticism of Israel’s actions in the West Bank and the Gaza blockade, is juxtaposed with his inclination towards military intervention, as evidenced during the Syrian conflict and the rise of ISIL. Cameron’s appointment as Foreign Secretary likely signals a continuation of robust UK-Israel relations (Mulla, Peter, 2023). While Cameron has expressed balanced views in the past, his strong support for Israel and a tendency for military solutions suggest a foreign policy that will likely favor Israel. Furthermore, Cameron’s established relationships with Middle Eastern leaders, particularly in Saudi Arabia, is expected to influence the UK’s strategic partnerships in the region. In essence, David Cameron’s role as Foreign Secretary is anticipated to maintain the UK’s firm support for Israel, underscore a readiness for military involvement in regional conflicts, and prioritize strategic alliances with key Middle Eastern nations. This approach could lead to a complex and, at times, contradictory policy stance in the Middle East, particularly regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict.
In response to Sir Keir Starmer’s refusal to back a ceasefire vote on the Israel-Hamas war, Labour MPs have demonstrated significant dissent within the party (Seddon, 2023). This rebellion is characterized by the resignation of ten frontbenchers and the defiance of 46 other MPs who supported a Scottish National Party (SNP) motion for a ceasefire in Gaza, in contrast to Starmer’s direction to abstain. High-profile figures like Jess Phillips and Naz Shah were among those who resigned from their roles in the shadow cabinet, citing a moral and constituency-based obligation to support the ceasefire. This revolt, involving more than a quarter of Labour MPs, indicates a deep division within the party on foreign policy matters, echoing past internal conflicts over Iraq and Syria. The dissent reflects a struggle to balance the party’s unity and electoral strategy with individual MPs’ conscience and their responsibility to their voters. Despite the internal conflict, Labour seems hesitant to escalate the issue into a larger battle with the leadership. The media analysis suggests that while this rebellion is significant, it may not necessarily set a precedent for future dissent. The focus remains on Labour’s readiness for governance and presenting a united front.
In the UK there has been no radical shift of the official stance. However, it is important to note that while we have seen David Cameron shifting towards a more humanitarian approach, at least in comparison to Sunak, the Foreign Office minister Leo Docherty has asserted that the UK will not be submitting evidence to the Office of the Prosecutor if the International Criminal Court regarding possible breaches of international humanitarian law. It must be noted that it was Cameron who was asked to make a statement in the Commons on the humanitarian situation in Gaza, but Docherty had to stand in his place. The minister has also refrained from answering questions regarding the presence of British forces in Gaza. He has, however, placed increased focus on the possibility of opening a maritime route for an increase in humanitarian supplies, and the possibility of exploring Kerem Shalon as a route for humanitarian aid.
Additionally, the UK Ministry of Defence has revealed that they will be sending several Shadow R1 reconnaissance aircraft to Israel. British sources claim that these aircraft are completely unarmed and will play no military role, they will merely provide “information relating to hostage rescue” (Comerford, 2023). This decision has been declared by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad has “direct involvement” in Israel’s “genocidal war” (PressTv, 2023).
The United Kingdom also abstained from the United Nations General Assembly vote. Furthermore, Cameron has a feud with the First Minister of Scotland, Humza Yousaf, who had an unauthorized meeting with Erdogan. Mr. Yousaf has been demanding an immediate ceasefire and called out the first minister because according to Cameron the two figureheads “must ensure that UK foreign policy, a reserved matter, is coherent and that (they) speak with one voice to the international community” (Watson, 2023). Additionally, during a parliamentary debate, Labour MP Begum called for transparency regarding the use of UK-made weapons in the conflict, a question that has not yet been answered.
Another topic of debate in the UK is the legality of British dual citizens serving in the IDF. Both Israel and the UK have concealed the number of dual nationals fighting in the Israeli army, however, an Israeli army reservist from Stanmore told the Times that judging by his friends there were “hundreds, if not thousands” (Hearst, 2023a). The question comes in light of the fact that the British foreign office stated that if a soldier were to travel to Ukraine to “fight, or to assist others engaged in war” their actions “may amount to offences under UK legislation and you could be prosecuted on your return” (Choudhury, 2024). The question is still greatly debated but the home Office minister for security has made the contradicting statements that “the UK recognises the right of dual nationals to sign up for military service in the country of their other nationality” (Gower, Brooke-Holland, 2023), but also that “anyone who travels to conflict zones to engage in unlawful activity should expect to be interrogated on return” (ibid.).
Furthermore, David Cameron has said that the UNSC vote, even if watered down, has shown “greater unity” (Independent, 2023). Over the crisis in Gaza. The UK has reiterated that they are doing everything they can to get more aid into their region which is now their main priority, Ambassador Woodward said that the UK tripled aid to the region and has experts on the ground to provide logistical support at al-Arish in Egypt.
EU state’s position to recognize a Palestinian State
Spain is among the countries (Ireland, Spain, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Hungary, Malta and Romania) whose stance has focused on the recognition of a Palestinian State. In fact, Prime Minister Sanchez has voiced his belief about the establishment of a viable Palestinian state. He has proposed that the international community, and specifically countries in Europe recognize the Palestinian State, which in his belief would be the best way to assure Israel’s national security. He further went on to assert that even if the European Union fails to acknowledge the Palestinian State, Spain may still choose to recognize it as an independent State. Spain continues to advocate for a two-state solution as the best means to resolving the current conflict.
Spain has also denounced what Sanchez called the “indiscriminate killing of Palestinians” (Reuters, 2023c). These remarks made at the Rafah crossing have also included calls for a long-term ceasefire. Israel Foreign Minister Eli Cohen has strongly responded to these comments claiming that the Prime Minister’s “false claims” (ibid.) have only boosted terrorism. Netanyahu has also criticism Sanchez and Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo for failing to highlight Hamas’ crimes against Israel.
There have been allegations that Spain has only adopted such a pro-Palestinian stance because the government is attempting to shift focus from the fact that it has provided millions in arms to the Israeli government. It is in fact under the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE)-Podemos government (supposedly left leaning) that trade relations reached €3,1 billion. The most recent arms sale by Spain was in June when the two countries celebrated the “Fifth Spain-Israel Strategic Dialogue” after which Spain bought 1.680 Spike LR2 anti-tank missiles which were worth €287 million. Between 2020 and 2022, Israel imported €140 million in weaponry and Spain spent hundreds of millions on the “combat-tested” weapons from Israel (López, 2023).
After Israel recalled its ambassador to Spain for consultations in Jerusalem, Sanchez spoke with Israel war cabinet member on the phone where he reiterated that Israel is “a partner and friend of Spain” (Arab News, 2023). Sanchez also added that he condemned the attacks of October 7 but reaffirmed that Israel must respect international humanitarian law. The socialist premier continues to reiterate that in his opinion the only solution to the current conflict is the recognition of the Palestinian State. Sanchez has said that his foreign policy priority is to “work in Europe and in Spain to recognize the Palestinian State” (Mcmurtry, 2023). The PM also said that if there is no consensus among the EU’s 27 member states Madrid may unilaterally recognize a Palestinian State.
Spain’s stance on the Hamas-Israeli conflict showcase a distinct divergence from the prevailing sentiment within the European Union. Spain seemed to prioritize an immediate cessation of hostilities, pushing for an immediate ceasefire. This urgency might be interpreted as a recognition of the human cost of prolonged conflict, emphasizing the immediate humanitarian concerns over broader geopolitical considerations.
In Belgium, trade unions have taken a resolute stance on the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine, urging members not to facilitate or handle weapon shipments intended for Israel. By requesting that ground handling workers in airports refrain from handling weapon deliveries, they are effectively leveraging their workforce to exert political pressure.
Norway’s official stance supports Israel’s right to self-defense and condemns the actions of Hamas while advocating for a proportionate response that adheres to international law and lead to a peaceful resolution to the conflict. At the Nordic Council meeting in Oslo, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store acknowledged Israel’s right to self-defense but pushed for proportionality to be taken into account by the Israeli authorities. At the United Nations General Assembly, Norway backed the resolution that called for an “immediate durable and sustained humanitarian truce” (Alarabiya news, 2023).
Both politicians from the right and the left in Norway have criticized Israel’s military activity in the Gaza Strip and the consequences they have had on civilians. Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide called that a ceasefire is agreed, after which peace talks between Israel and Palestinians are resumed. Eide further expressed concern that the conflict would lead to an escalation of hostilities in the West Bank and emphasized the need for an urgent two-State solution. He also voiced support for an international peace conference for the Middle East. Demonstrations in Norway have called for a ceasefire and urged their politicians to consider sanctions against Israel, this pressure could have political outcomes.
Pro-Palestinian protests
Protests around Europe have gathered tens of thousands of people in the streets in support of Palestine and calling for an immediate ceasefire. In London, 300.000 people were present on Monday, October 21, making history as it was the largest British protest to ever happen since 2003. Pro-Palestine movement in the United Kingdom has been growing (Ducourtieux, 2023).
The magnitude of these protests has brought to light the substantial gap between public opinion and government actions prevalent in the West, but it also seems to yield results. In the UK, Britain Home Secretary Suella Braverman has said that pro-Palestinian protests could not go on: “Week by week, the streets of London are being polluted by hate, violence and antisemitism. Members of the public are being mobbed and intimidated” (Wingate, 2023). She also alleged, in an article in the Times of London that the police were “playing favorites” (Gordon, 2023) and not enforcing the law when it came to pro-Palestine protests in London and referring to protestors as “hate marchers”. She was later fired for her contentious remarks. The increase of protests may be a factor for change on European governments’ actions and statements as some governments are slowly shifting their official stance.
In the UK, however, pro-Palestinian protests are more popular than ever. Not since the major anti-Brexit protests of 2019 have Britons taken to the streets in such numbers. In order to find such a high level of mobilization, we need to go back to the huge anti-Iraq war marches in February 2003 during which 1,5 million people marched through London against Tony Blair’s government’s military involvement alongside the Americans. For example, on November 20, Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP) staged a protest at the UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office’s Global Food Security Summit in London, drawing attention to Gaza’s severe food and water shortage. Protesters, using empty plates with messages like “Feed Gaza, Ceasefire Now,” urged an end to Israel’s siege. MAP CEO Melanie Ward highlighted the urgent situation, with 2,2 million in Gaza at risk of starvation due to Israeli food import restrictions. Ward criticized the UK government’s “inadequate” response, emphasizing its responsibility under UN Security Council Resolution 2417.
This support for the Palestinian cause in the UK can be explained because the country does not have the same past or the same relationship with the Holocaust as other European countries, having served as a sanctuary for Jewish populations who managed to escape the Nazi abomination during the Second World War. Criticism of the Israeli government may therefore seem easier. As for the political class, it firmly condemns anti-semitisim acts, but it is equally keen to denounce attacks on Muslims. Pro-Palestinian protests and the struggle against growing antisemitism in Europe is coming into conflict. In Germany, authorities have prohibited numerous protests in the name of combating anti-Semitism. This is particularly noteworthy in Germany, where criticism of Israel is significantly curtailed as part of Holocaust atonement. However, numerous individuals within its immigrant communities, including Arabs and many progressive Jews and Israelis, argue that these restrictions not only infringe upon free speech but are also discriminatory.
Marches against antisemitism have also sparked controversy. On November 12, French Senate President Gérard Larcher (right-wing) called for an anti-antisemitism March. However, due to the involvement of extreme-right parties, the event faced criticism, with many denouncing it as a politically opportunistic move by parties whose original doctrine is negationist and antisemitic. In response, left-wing parties in France organized a counter-march. Moreover, on Monday 13, after the marches against anti-Semitism in France, Elie Korchia, president of the Consistoire central Israelite de France, lamented the “glaring lack” (Guay, 2023) of Muslim worship at these major gatherings. As a response to the controversy, actor Lubna Azabal, in a letter signed by 500 artists, called for a peaceful march on November 19 in Paris from the Institut du Monde Arabe to the Musée d’Art et d’Histoire du Judaïsme. The march aims to be “silent, supportive, humanist and peaceful”, emphasising unity over divisive allegiances, with no room for political demands or slogans (Telerama, 2023).
In France, pro-Palestinian protests are also popular, and analysts have individualized two types of protesters. There are the ones that protest by identification, which comprises the Arab and Muslim communities. However, their identification is not necessarily related to being Muslim, but is more linked to a common struggle, the colonial oppression they have faced. The Palestinian cause therefore reflects their own history. The other type are the ones protesting by convictions. The typical profile is a man or woman over 60, left-leaning, and a union member.
Conclusion
The ongoing Gaza war has not only underscored the persistent and deep-seated nature of the Israeli Palestinian conflict but has also highlighted significant complexities in the international community’s responses. Through the lens of neorealism, constructivism and international humanitarian law, this study demonstrates how historical legacies, security concerns, and global power dynamics shape the policies of European nations toward the conflict.
From a neorealist perspective, the strategic alliances of European States with Israel reflected broader geopolitical interests, emphasizing security and regional stability. However, this focus often sidelines the pressing humanitarian needs of Palestinian civilians in Gaza, exacerbating their vulnerabilities and fostering perceptions of bias.
The constructivist lens revealed the profound influence of historical narratives and national identities on foreign policy. Countries like Germany, shaped by Holocaust guilt, or Ireland, influenced by its colonial past, exemplify how deeply rooted societal values shape differing stances toward the conflict. These narratives not only influence policy but also dictate the discourse around the war, revealing the moral and ethical dilemmas faced by European governments.
Finally, the application of international humanitarian law raises pressing concerns about accountability and civilian protection in the Gaza war. Despite clear legal frameworks, violations have gone largely unchecked, questioning the effectiveness of global mechanisms in ensuring justice and adherence to humanitarian principles.
In conclusion, the Gaza war is emblematic of a broader international failure to address the root causes of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. European responses often oscillate between strategic alliances and moral obligations, resulting in fragmented and inconsistent approaches. To pave the way for sustainable peace, there is a need for a more balanced, equitable, and inclusive framework—one that prioritizes human rights, addresses historical injustices, and ensures accountabilities for all parties involved. Such an approach requires moving beyond rhetoric to meaningful action, fostering a renewed commitment to justice and the principles of international law.
Dialoghi Mediterranei, n. 78, marzo 2026
[*] Abstract
Questo articolo esamina il posizionamento politico degli Stati europei durante i primi tre mesi della guerra di Gaza (ottobre-dicembre 2023), concentrandosi sull’Unione Europea e sulle risposte nazionali di Francia, Germania e Regno Unito. Analizza come la diplomazia europea abbia bilanciato l’allineamento strategico con Israele, gli impegni normativi nei confronti del diritto internazionale umanitario e le crescenti preoccupazioni umanitarie a Gaza. Attingendo a quadri costruttivisti e neorealisti, lo studio mostra come eredità storiche, politiche identitarie e considerazioni di sicurezza abbiano prodotto posizioni nazionali divergenti e limitato la capacità dell’UE di agire come attore diplomatico coerente. Metodologicamente, l’articolo si basa su una ricerca documentale qualitativa, che include dichiarazioni ufficiali, documenti politici, copertura mediatica e rapporti di ONG, integrata da un’analisi della mobilitazione filo-palestinese in tutta Europa. I risultati dimostrano un divario persistente tra la retorica umanitaria e la pratica politica concreta, poiché gli attori europei hanno combinato le richieste di protezione dei civili con il continuo sostegno politico, economico e militare a Israele. L’articolo sostiene che queste contraddizioni hanno indebolito la credibilità normativa dell’Europa e messo in luce i limiti strutturali delle sue pretese di neutralità nel conflitto di Gaza.
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Marie Kortam, is a Senior Research and Policy Advisor at War Child. She is a sociologist, researcher with interdisciplinary experience in the field of P/CVE, conflict transformation, Human Rights, migration studies, and an expert in strategy development, policy studies and policymaking. She is an Associate Researcher at the French Institute of the Near-East (IFPO – Beirut).Kortam served a Human Rights and Security Research Policy Advisor at the Lebanese Palestinian committee Dialogue in the Lebanese Government and as Advisor for Lebanon at the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue-Geneva. Prior to joining War Child, Marie was a senior research fellow at Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme FMSH-Paris where she led the European H2020 project PAVE. She has occupied different visiting fellows’ position in different European countries, and developed a community-based approach on different study areas. Marie collaborates in many research projects and leads number of studies. Marie holds a Ph.D in Sociology and an MA in clinical sociology from Paris Cité University, as well as a Master in Social Work and communication from Saint-Joseph University Beirut. She has (co-) authored numerous publications in the field of refugees and migration studies, security studies, violent extremism and human rights, such as: Les luttes dans la marge, Violences (in)visibles et quête de justice à Tripoli après la guerre civile libanaise, Ifpo. 2024. Vulnerability and Resilience to violent extremism, An Actor centric Approach. Routledge. 2023. “Various faces of Violent Radicalization in the Syrian crises”, in Routledge Handbook of Middle East Politics, Routledge, 2020. “Gendering (in-) Security: Barriers and Frontiers in Urban Tripoli-Lebanon”, Palgrave Macmillon, 2017. Palestinian youth, French youth: common points face of violence and oppression, Harmattan, 2012. Marie developed an expertise in bridging knowledge production, policy studies and implementation across Europe and the MENA. She has taught at different universities in France and Lebanon. Since 2007, she has participated or managed multiple interdisciplinary, collaborative projects and intervention on prevention of violent extremism, mediation, shaping rebels and violent behaviour, inclusive political and security process. She conducts regular policy advice, peer exchange and comparative learning for political and social stakeholders in conflict zones.
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