di Enzo Rossi [*]
1. Introduction: the securitization paradox
Italian public debate on migration governance has consolidated around a paradigm that identifies administrative detention and deterrence as the primary instruments of migration control. This paradigm rests on an operative assumption that is rarely made explicit: that the distinction relevant to public security is that between regular and irregular subjects. This paper argues that the assumption overlooks a more operationally significant distinction, that between irregularity as an administrative status and irregularity as structural dependency on criminal networks, producing paradoxical effects with respect to stated objectives.
This distinction is already implicit in the architecture of Directive 2008/115/EC, which treats administrative irregularity and criminality as distinct categories. Its practical implications are, however, systematically ignored by policymakers. A foreign national without a residence permit who operates in the informal labour market represents an administrative problem. A person without legal status who is stably embedded in a criminal organization represents a qualitatively different public security problem. Policies that treat these two conditions as equivalent do not reduce the second: they intervene on the conditions that determine the transition from one to the other.
This paper argues that Italy’s administrative detention framework – developed from Legislative Decree 113/2018 (converted into Law 132/2018) and consolidated by Legislative Decree 20/2023 (converted into Law 50/2023) – produces, among its unintended effects, a reinforcement of criminal recruitment mechanisms through two dynamics. On one side, the removal of training services from CAS facilities (Centri di Accoglienza Straordinaria, Extraordinary Reception Centres) eliminates what may be defined as a «social airbag», reducing migrants’ capacity to resist mediated forms of exploitation. On the other, detention in CPRs (Centri di Permanenza per il Rimpatrio, pre-removal detention facilities), structured as enforced inactivity and relational deprivation, deteriorates psychological and social capital, increasing vulnerability to recruitment at the point of release.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reconstructs the regulatory evolution of the reception system. Section 3 presents the main empirical evidence on the functioning of CPRs. Section 4 analyses the mechanism of vulnerability production. Section 5 reframes CPRs as devices of marginalization amplification. Section 6 examines the case of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children as evidence of institutional invisibility and governance failure. Section 7 develops the policy proposal and conclusions.
2. The regulatory dismantling: from the integrated model to pure containment (2015–2026)
The current configuration of Italy’s reception and detention system is the result of a regulatory transformation that, over a decade, has redefined the relationship between reception and integration, moving from a model that incorporated inclusive mechanisms in the initial reception phase to one centred on administrative containment.
The starting point may be identified in Legislative Decree 142/2015, which, transposing Directive 2013/33/EU, configured CAS facilities not as mere shelter-and-subsistence structures but as places providing social orientation, Italian language instruction, and vocational training. Integration was not conceived as a subsequent phase conditional on the outcome of the protection application, but as a process initiated from the moment of entry into the system. This approach responded to a precise logic: the multi-year stay of asylum seekers pending determination of their status is a structural condition of the system, and training during the waiting period reduced vulnerability regardless of the procedural outcome.
Evidence collected immediately before the 2018 reform confirms the functioning of this model and documents its internal mechanisms. A study of CAS facilities in Rome and its province (Rossi et al., 2019), conducted under the AMIF (Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund) 2014–2020 programme at the request of the Rome Prefecture, found that the proportion of residents in employment upon exit reached 12.9% in medium-small centres (capacity below 50 units) compared with 0.9% in large centres, with analogous results for traineeships (14.1% vs 6.3%). This differential was not attributable to differences in resident composition, but to the greater capacity of smaller centres to personalize pathways and build functional links with local institutions — an operational quality difference rendered irrelevant by the 2018 reform, which eliminated training content from both types. The study already recorded a rapid deterioration of outcomes in the three months following the decree: participation in civic education courses fell from 21.8% to 15.3%.
Legislative Decree 113/2018 produced a structural break, sharply separating reception from integration: CAS facilities were reduced to material assistance structures, with language instruction, employment orientation, and vocational training removed from procurement specifications. Integration pathways were reserved exclusively for holders of protection status within the SAI system (Sistema di Accoglienza e Integrazione, the Reception and Integration System). Legislative Decree 20/2023 reinforced the containment logic, whilst Legislative Decree 124/2023 extended the maximum detention period in CPRs to 18 months. The result is a dual system in which the integration function is separated, both temporally and institutionally, from the reception phase, and is accessible only to a selected proportion of the migrant population. The Italian regulatory framework fits within a broader European trajectory: on 26 March 2026, the European Parliament approved its negotiating position on a new Returns Regulation intended to replace Directive 2008/115/EC, extending detention to 24 months and prioritizing coercive removal over voluntary departure, amplifying at European level the logic analysed in this paper. The text is currently in trilogue and has not yet entered into force.
3. How the CPR system functions: empirical evidence
The data presented in this section are drawn primarily from the Trattenuti database (ActionAid/University of Bari, 2024), compiled through 97 freedom-of-information requests; our original elaborations of the raw data (137 countries, 12 CPRs) are presented here for the first time. These data are supplemented by the monitoring reports of the National Ombudsman for Detained Persons (Garante Nazionale, 2023) and the Asylum and Immigration Table (TAI, 2026).
Indicator |
Value (source) |
A. Historical series of CPR entries 2018–2024 (elaboration on Trattenuti database) |
|
| Entries 2018 |
8.138 |
| Entries 2019 |
12.020 |
| Entries 2020 |
8.862 |
| Entries 2021 |
10.432 |
| Entries 2022 |
12.914 |
| Entries 2023 |
13.428 |
| Entries 2024 |
12.328 |
| Origin: asylum seekers (2018–2024 average) |
23,4% |
| Origin: asylum seekers (2024) |
45,0% |
| Origin: transfer from prison (ten-year average) |
14,0% |
| Origin: transfer from prison (2024) |
31,2% |
| B. Removal effectiveness (elaboration on Trattenuti database) | |
| Removal rate on entries 2018 |
26,1% |
| Removal rate on entries 2019–2023 (average) |
~39,5% |
| Removal rate on entries 2024 |
39,1% |
| Detainees without removal in 2022 (Garante Nazionale, 2023) |
50,6% |
| Average detention length 2014–2024 |
36 days |
| C. Removal rate by nationality, 2024 (elaboration on Trattenuti database) | |
| Tunisia (operational bilateral agreement) |
59,4% |
| Albania |
47,1% |
| Egypt |
44,5% |
| Morocco (non-operational agreement) |
8,4% |
| Bangladesh |
9,7% |
| Ghana |
1,1% |
| D. Costs and conditions (Trattenuti database; TAI, 2026) | |
| Total CPR system cost 2018–2024 |
€113 million (Italian CPRs 2018–2024) |
| Extraordinary maintenance, Italian CPRs |
€32M of €41M building expenditure (78% of building expenditure; equivalent to 45% of ordinary management costs) |
| Daily per-capita cost: CPR Milan (highest) / CPR Ragusa (lowest) |
82,22 € / 28,55 € |
| Detainees administered psychotropic drugs – CPR Rome / Bari / Milan |
~80% / ~50% / ~35% |
Table 1. Elaboration on Trattenuti database 2024 (ActionAid/University of Bari), Garante Nazionale (2023), TAI (2026). The historical series and nationality rates are original elaborations by the author on raw data.
3.1 Composition and dynamics of entries
Over the period 2018–2024, annual entries into CPRs ranged between 8,138 and 13,428, totalling approximately 88,000 entries over the seven years (Table 1, sec. A). The system has thus acquired a structural rather than residual character in the management of irregular migration. Particularly significant is the shift in composition: the proportion of asylum seekers rose from an average of 23.4% over the 2018–2024 period to 45% in 2024, signalling a growing overlap between the protection and the detention systems. Entries transferred from prison averaged 14% over the decade, rising to 31.2% in 2024.
3.2 Removal effectiveness and deterrence logic
If the declared objective of detention is the execution of removal, the data reveal limited and unstable effectiveness. The removal rate ranged between 26.1% in 2018 and 46.0% in 2022, settling at 39.1% in 2024 (Table 1, sec. B). More than half of all detainees are thus released without removal having been carried out. The Garante Nazionale (2023, p. 46) certified that in 2022 alone, 50.6% of detainees underwent a deprivation of liberty lacking the purpose that would legally justify it under Article 5 ECHR and Directive 2008/115/EC.
A crucial element for interpretation is the marked variation in rates by nationality (Table 1, sec. C). In 2024, Tunisia recorded 59.4, Albania 47.1%, Egypt 44.5%, all countries with operational bilateral readmission agreements. By contrast, Morocco stood at 8.4%, Bangladesh at 9.7%, Ghana at 1.1%. The determinant variable for removal outcomes is not the length of detention but the existence of diplomatic agreements: this renders structurally predictable the ineffectiveness of prolonged detention for a growing proportion of detainees, and directs policy towards negotiating bilateral agreements rather than extending detention periods.
The data reveal no positive correlation between the length of detention and removal effectiveness.
3.3 Costs and conditions of detention
Over the period 2018–2024, total expenditure on Italian CPRs amounted to approximately €113 million, of which €71.2 million for ordinary management and €32 million for extraordinary maintenance. The latter is equivalent to 45% of ordinary management costs and attributable primarily to damage from riots and self-harm (Table 1, sec. D). The daily per-capita cost ranged between €28.55 (CPR Ragusa) and €82.22 (CPR Milan). As will be argued in Section 7, the imbalance between management costs and riot-related costs constitutes one of the central economic arguments for the training proposal. TAI (2026) monitoring documented widespread use of psychotropic drugs, with proportions of detainees receiving medication ranging from 35% (Milan) to 80% (Rome): a figure that does not reflect pre-existing clinical need, but the pharmacological response to distress induced by detention.
4. The mechanism of vulnerability production
The CPR system releases a majority of detainees in a condition of irregularity: understanding the implications of this outcome requires examining the mechanisms linking institutional structures to individual trajectories. The combined operation of reception policies and the detention system may be interpreted as a process of institutional production of vulnerability, articulated in two complementary phases.
4.1 Reduction of bargaining capital
The transformation of the reception system described in Section 2 entailed the elimination of language training, employment orientation, and vocational skills acquisition from CAS facilities. This change affects not only long-term integration prospects but immediately alters the negotiating position of individuals in the informal labour market.
The concept of bargaining capital (Calavita, 2005) describes this dynamic: it encompasses the set of resources (linguistic, relational, and professional) that enable an individual to negotiate the terms of economic participation even in irregular contexts; without them, labour-market access occurs predominantly through intermediaries who introduce forms of structural dependency. Melossi (2015) has highlighted how regulatory and administrative mechanisms contribute to defining the boundaries of economic deviance, shaping the ways in which marginalized subjects access resources and opportunities.
Reduced bargaining capital does not automatically lead to criminal involvement, but increases the probability that labour-market insertion occurs under conditions of exploitation or under the control of organized networks. The mechanism also operates for individuals who may ultimately be removed: literature on voluntary assisted return programmes (de Haas, 2010; Cassarino, 2004) documents significantly lower rates of re-emigration among returnees with professional competencies, as local labour-market reintegration becomes practicable.
4.2 Deterioration of psychological and social capital
The first mechanism is compounded by the deterioration of psychological and social capital produced by detention conditions. De Giorgi (2010) has shown that incarceration systems structurally deepen the vulnerability of the populations they detain: the institution does not merely hold individuals in suspension but actively degrades the capacities they will need upon release. Enforced inactivity, relational deprivation, and the absence of structured psychological support reduce individuals’ cognitive, emotional, and relational capacities. Extended residence in conditions of uncertainty and passivity produces effects that do not cease at the point of release, but impair the capacity for reintegration.
This dynamic is consistent with Wacquant’s (2009) analyses, according to which containment institutions do not merely manage marginality but contribute to reproducing it through processes of desocialization. From this perspective, the CPR may be interpreted as a device that reduces individuals’ subjective capacities and their possibilities for autonomous action.
4.3 From administrative irregularity to criminal dependency
The interaction between these two mechanisms clarifies the distinction between irregularity as an administrative status and irregularity as dependency on criminal networks. In the first case, the individual operates at the margins of legality whilst maintaining a degree of autonomy. In the second, access to employment, income, and often housing is mediated by organisations that exercise forms of control. In the absence of practicable alternatives, the condition that the described mechanisms systematically produce, criminal networks offer not only economic opportunities but also protection and belonging that are difficult to replace in the short term. The transition from one condition to the other is not automatic, but becomes more probable in the presence of high levels of vulnerability. As documented by Clarke (1983) and Baratta (1982), reducing deviance requires not only the sanctioning of deviant behaviour but the creation of practicable alternatives: and it is precisely this that the removal of training services suppresses.
The process described does not imply intentionality: policies pursue security objectives but produce as an emergent effect the structural conditions that facilitate the expansion of illegal economies.
5. CPRs as devices of vulnerability amplification
The dynamics described in Section 4 allow a rereading of CPRs not merely as instruments that fail the objective of removal, but as devices that actively amplify the marginalization of those who pass through them.
The first dimension of this amplification concerns the configuration of time as enforced inactivity In the absence of structured activities, detention time loses any orientating or project-building function produces direct deterioration of psychological capital.
The second dimension concerns the relational structure: restrictions on communications, the rotation of detainees, and the absence of stable relational contexts progressively fragment social bonds and reduce the availability of support networks. Without such networks, access to fundamental resources will shift towards informal and often illegal channels.
The third dimension concerns healthcare management. As shown by data in Table 1, the widespread use of psychotropic drugs responds to immediate distress management needs, but occurs within a context of inadequate structured psychological support. The effect is pharmacological behaviour regulation that contributes to temporary stabilization without addressing the underlying causes of distress, with negative effects on cognitive and emotional capacities in the medium term.
The fourth dimension concerns management logic. As documented by TAI (2026), the system has become a de facto oligopoly: a small number of private providers hold the near-totality of national contracts, often awarded on the basis of standards subsequently not complied with, in a context of prefectural oversight judged insufficient by the Council of State itself, which partially annulled the national procurement specification for inadequacies in healthcare and psychiatric standards. Data from Rossi et al. (2019), already discussed in Section 2, provide the counterfactual: the outcome differential between small and large CAS facilities was not structural but managerial and was produced by the personalization of pathways and territorial connections possible in smaller centres. Inclusive centres with effective governance are thus a determinant variable. This configuration implies that any proposal to introduce training services in CPRs must first address the governance question: the practicability of the proposal depends on a structural reform of the procurement system, to be discussed in Section 7.
Taken together, these dimensions support the interpretation of CPRs as social risk multipliers. Individuals leaving the centres find themselves in a position of greater vulnerability than at the point of entry: reduced bargaining capital, fragmented social networks, deteriorated psychological capacities. In these conditions, criminal networks frequently represent the only available structure of incorporation.
6. Unaccompanied asylum-seeking children: a stress test of institutional invisibility and governance failure
Unaccompanied asylum-seeking children (UASC) are uniquely positioned to test the argument: unlike other categories, UASCs are beneficiaries of relatively high public investment and a regulatory framework formally oriented towards protection and integration: Law 47/2017 (the Zampa Law) provides for non-refoulement, access to education, legal guardianship, and training pathways. If the failure were solely a function of absent public investment, UASCs, wich were protected by comparatively generous statutory provisions, would be expected to fare significantly better than adults in CAS facilities. The evidence shows otherwise, pointing to governance failure rather than regulatory neglect as the primary driver.
6.1 Demographic profile and the critical transition
As of 31 December 2024, 18,625 UASCs were present in Italy, with a male prevalence of 87.8% (AGIA, 2024). The demographically most significant finding is that 53.7% of registered minors are aged 17, that is within twelve months of a legally critical transition. Reaching adulthood opens a narrowing funnel in which the available protective pathways are multiple but systemically fragile: a pending asylum application guarantees continued residence in SAI until the procedure is determined; the «administrative continuation» (Art. 13, Law 47/2017) allows the juvenile court to order continued residence in social services until the age of 21, but is discretionary and reaches, according to AGIA (2024), «a small percentage» of newly adult persons; conversion of the minor’s residence permit into a work or study permit requires documentation that is frequently inaccessible, and the employment-awaiting permit requires finding employment within one year. Legislative Decree 20/2023 has further restricted these possibilities. Those who fall outside all three pathways automatically slide into irregularity.
6.2 The double failure: written rule and enacted practice
The UASC case introduces an analytically significant distinction from the dynamic described for adult CAS facilities. In CAS, training was normatively removed as a deliberate legislative choice in 2018. For UASCs in dedicated structures, training is provided for by law but systematically inadequate in practice. AGIA (2024) documents that UASCs, particularly those arriving late with linguistic difficulties and economic urgency, are «rarely» effectively reached by vocational training. The final outcome is identical: at the point of exit from the system, the individual lacks the tools to manage their own condition autonomously.
This case illustrates a general principle: the systematic gap between written rule and enacted practice produces the same effects as the absence of a rule. Failure is not necessarily normative; it may be procedural, organisational, and financial: opaque procurement, providers lacking specialization, absence of accountability over services delivered. Newly adult former UASCs also constitute a statistically undetected category: the Trattenuti database contains no age variable, making it impossible to quantify how many of them pass through CPRs. TAI (2026) fills this gap with a direct empirical observation: it documents the presence in CPRs of «young adults who have just reached adulthood», describing their age as «a clear indicator of vulnerability in the context of CPRs» and noting that «the State bears a heightened responsibility to ensure that the environment does not produce irreparable harm to their physical and mental health». These are individuals who passed through the UASC reception system, with its dedicated structures, legal guardians, and educational pathways mandated by Law 47/2017, and arrived in a CPR nonetheless. The investment was made; the integration did not consolidate. TAI (2026) identifies the structural consequence: a «vicious cycle of marginality, petty criminality, and irregularity that leads to detention», which simultaneously «feeds and legitimizes the security-driven drift on which the propaganda of administrative detention rests». This is not an anecdotal observation; it is the documented endpoint of the failure described in this section. The newly adult individual who enters the detention circuit brings the total loss of that public investment plus the additional cost of detention itself. If the system exhibits structural failures even in the best-protected category, they reflect a systemic logic, not an exception. The prerequisite of the proposal formulated in Section 7 – governance reform before any introduction of training services – is therefore not specific to CPRs: it is the structural condition for any training provision to produce real effects at any point in the migration governance chain.
7. Civic orientation and vocational training as a public security measure: proposal and conclusions
The evidence presented grounds a policy proposal formulated as a public security measure. The dimension of migrants’ individual rights merits independent consideration; our argument operates on the plane of realistic migration policy management, demonstrating that compliance with treatment standards and security effectiveness are not conflicting but convergent objectives.
The proposal is articulated on two levels. The first is the reinstatement of vocational training, language instruction, and civic orientation as mandatory services in CAS for all asylum seekers, regardless of the foreseeable outcome of the application. The increase of legal opportunities and the strengthening of social capital that training produces are the primary factors in reducing vulnerability to criminal recruitment: the creation of practicable alternatives reduces deviance, whilst the psychological and relational deterioration produced by the void constitutes its structural premise. The second, more innovative, is the in-custody extension of those training components compatible with detention conditions to CPRs: language literacy, rights orientation, and basic theoretical vocational knowledge, necessarily excluding external traineeships and work placements, which are incompatible with the detention regime. The objection that detainees facing removal should not be trained is countered by two considerations. With a removal rate of 42% and a distribution of outcomes that is not determinable ex ante, training is rational for the entire detained population — like fitting airbags in a car regardless of the individual probability of an accident. As for those removed, literature on voluntary assisted return programmes (de Haas, 2010; Cassarino, 2004) documents lower rates of re-emigration for those returning with usable competencies, reducing both new irregular migration and, for the proportion eventually inserted in transnational criminal networks, dependency on those networks.
This second proposal is, however, conditional on a premise that cannot be circumvented: under the current framework, training is not specified in procurement contracts as an enforceable service, and the CPR governance system (privatised, oligopolistic, with prefectural oversight judged insufficient by the Council of State itself) does not offer the conditions for its effective introduction. The UASC case provides the empirical confirmation: even where Law 47/2017 mandates training, the absence of adequate governance (opaque procurement, providers lacking specialization, absence of accountability) renders the provision ineffective and the investment lost. Regulatory change is necessary but not sufficient: before training can be introduced into CPRs, procurement contracts must specify minimum enforceable standards, prefectural oversight must be strengthened, and the management of training services must be entrusted to providers distinct from the ordinary centre operator.
On the plane of EU law, the existing regulatory framework provides an institutional basis for the practicability of the proposal without requiring primary legislative modifications. Directive 2013/33/EU (Articles 16 and 17) obliges Member States to guarantee adequate reception conditions and permits asylum seekers’ access to vocational training independently of access to the labour market: a faculty that has remained largely unutilised in Italian law. Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 mandates access to adequate services for detainees. The structural void documented by TAI (2026) and the Garante Nazionale (2023) is difficult to reconcile with these standards; compliance with them simultaneously produces the security effects this paper documents. ASGI (2024) has documented how the Court of Cassation has repeatedly sanctioned detention validations issued without adequate assessment of living conditions in the centres, providing administrations with an additional incentive to improve them.
On the plane of economic rationality, Italian CPRs accumulated approximately €32 million in extraordinary maintenance over the period 2018–2024, attributable to conditions produced by enforced inactivity. Under detention conditions, only classroom-deliverable components are practicable: language literacy (level A1–A2), rights orientation, and basic theoretical vocational knowledge, necessarily excluding external traineeships and work placements. The unit cost per beneficiary is estimable at between €1,500 and €2,500, on the basis of recent AMIF programmes published by the Ministry of the Interior. This is an indirect estimate elaborated by the author, as procurement specifications do not contain direct per-capita costs. This represents the minimal but operationally effective version of the contractual airbag described in Section 1: not full integration, but a measurable reduction of vulnerability at the point of release. In 2022, the peak year with €9.6 million in extraordinary maintenance, that figure would have covered training for approximately 4,800 detainees, representing 37% of annual entries. Extending training to the entire detained population would cost approximately twice the average annual extraordinary maintenance expenditure, whilst structurally eliminating its cause.
The proposal to reinstate training serves a dual function: as a mandatory service in CAS, it restores the social protection dismantled in 2018; as a structured in-custody component of detention time in CPRs, it interrupts the vulnerability cycle at the point of detention. It is neither a moralistic proposal nor an advocacy argument: it is a public security proposal grounded in empirical evidence, criminological analysis, and economic calculation, and is consistent with European Union law. Conditional on prior governance reform of the centres to guarantee its practicability. Security is not produced through the invisibility of subjects, but through their autonomy, even partial, and even within the informal economy.
Dialoghi Mediterranei, n. 79, maggio 2026
[*] Abstract
Il contributo analizza il sistema dei Centri di Permanenza per il Rimpatrio (CPR) e il progressivo smantellamento dei dispositivi di integrazione nei centri di accoglienza straordinaria (CAS), argomentando che tali politiche producono effetti strutturalmente contrari agli obiettivi dichiarati di sicurezza pubblica. La tesi si sviluppa su tre livelli. Il primo è criminologico: la rimozione dei percorsi formativi riduce il capitale contrattuale del migrante irregolare, aumentando la probabilità che l’inserimento lavorativo avvenga attraverso reti criminali. Il secondo è deterrenziale: i dati del sistema CPR nel periodo 2018–2024 mostrano che la durata del trattenimento non è correlata alla probabilità di rimpatrio – che dipende invece dall’esistenza di accordi bilaterali operativi – mentre produce un deterioramento documentato del capitale psichico e sociale. Il terzo è sistemico: il caso dei minori stranieri non accompagnati mostra che il fallimento si riproduce anche in presenza di investimenti pubblici significativi, quando manca continuità tra accoglienza e integrazione. Si propone la reintroduzione della formazione nei CAS e la sua estensione ai CPR nella sola componente intra-murale come misura di ordine pubblico, condizionata a una radicale riforma della governance dei centri.
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Enzo Rossi, già Professore Ordinario di Economia Politica presso l’Università di Roma “Tor Vergata”, è autore di pubblicazioni su riviste italiane ed internazionali su argomenti relativi allo sviluppo economico, le migrazioni, i diritti umani. Negli ultimi anni ha studiato le relazioni fra diritto ed economia, estendendo l’analisi alla intersezione con i fattori sociologici. Ha fondato il CREG (Centro di Ricerche Economiche e Giuridiche) ed il Master MEDIM (Master su Economia, Diritto e Intercultura delle Migrazioni), presso la stessa università, ove è professore a contratto di Economia e Regolamentazione delle Migrazioni. Ha svolto attività di ricerca, anche nell’ottica della terza missione, in Mozambico ed in Brasile, ove ha lavorato con Associazioni ed ONG, in concerto con alcune Università brasiliane, incentivando la partecipazione degli studenti di Tor Vergata. Da queste esperienze sono scaturite ricerche di campo sui bambini in condizione di strada di Rio de Janeiro e su alcune favelas nel Minas Gerais, con pubblicazioni in italiano e portoghese. Ha collaborato con il Governo dello Stato di Minas Gerais per l’implementazione di sistemi di microcredito.
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